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(57)	 ABSTRACT
A secure system for authenticating the identity of ADS-B
systems, including: an authenticator, including a unique id
generator and a transmitter transmitting the unique id to one
or more ADS-B transmitters; one or more ADS-B transmit-
ters, including a receiver receiving the unique id, one or more
secure processing stages merging the unique id with the
ADS-B transmitter's identification, data and secret key and
generating a secure code identification and a transmitter
transmitting a response containing the secure code andADSB
transmitter's data to the authenticator; the authenticator
including means for independently determining eachADS-B
transmitter's secret key, a receiver receiving each ADS-B
transmitter's response, one or more secure processing stages
merging the unique id, ADS-B transmitter's identification
and data and generating a secure code, and comparison pro-
cessing comparing the authenticator-generated secure code
and the ADS-B transmitter-generated secure code and pro-
viding an authentication signal based on the comparison
result.
28 Claims, 3 Drawing Sheets
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SECURE ADS-B AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 	 receiving the ADS-B transmitter's transmitted response con-
AND METHOD	 taining the ADS-B transmitter-generated secure code, spe-
cific data and ID; the authenticator independently determin-
The Government of the United States ofAmerica has rights 	 ing the ADS-B transmitter system's secret-key; generating a
in this invention pursuant to Cooperative Agreement 5 secure output by inputting the unique identifier, the ADS-B
NNCO5AA02A, awarded by the National Aeronautic and	 transmitter's specific data, ID and secret-key in secure pro-
Space Administration (NASA).
	
	 cessing at the authenticator; generating a secure code by
inputting the requestor-generated secure output into a second
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED	 secure process; comparing the authenticator-generated
APPLICATION
	
	 io secure code and the ADS-B transmitter-generated secure
code using comparison processing; and authenticating the
This application is related to U.S. patent application Ser. 	 ADS-B transmitter's identity by determining that the authen-
No. 10/285,070 filed Oct. 31, 2002, the entirety of which is 	 ticator-generated secure code and the ADS-B transmitter-
incorporated herein by reference. 	 generated secure code are the same.
15 The secure authentication ADS-B system and method of
FIELD OF THE INVENTION	 the present invention overcomes the authentication vulner-
ability of an airspace by providing a means for authenticating
The present invention relates to the general area ofADS-B 	 ADS-B equipped platform's identity.
(Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, a field of
aviation surveillance) and in particular to a method and appa-  20	 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
ratus for securely authenticating aircraft identity from unen-
crypted or encrypted broadcast ADS-B position report mes- 	 FIG.1 is ablockdiagram of a secureADS-B authentication
sage (hereinafter ADS-B message) data, providing enhanced	 system in accordance with one embodiment of the present
security in an airspace.	 invention.
25	 FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an unsolicited ADS-B authen-
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
	
	
tication system in accordance with a second embodiment of
the present invention.
ADS-B is a technology that is being developed and 	 FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an encrypted ADS-B authen-
deployed around the world to enhance aviation safety by	 tication system in accordance with a third embodiment of the
allowing aircraft to make accurate and timely reports of their 30 present invention.
position, velocity, identification, capability, and intentions.
The current ADS-B message protocol lacks any identity	 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
authentication scheme andADS-B data is currently broadcast
without encryption or other security measures. In addition, 	 The authentication apparatus of the present invention
the current direction in air traffic control is to rely on the 35 includes an ADS-B system and secure processing including
ADS-B message data for the control and management of air 	 memory for loading and storing an ADS-B equipped plat-
traffic. This leaves the current ATC system vulnerable to 	 form's secret key. The authentication apparatus of the authen-
broadcast of false identification data. 	 tication challenging system further includes a unique identi-
What is needed is a method of authenticating an aircraft's	 fier generator and identity authentication processing
identity, thereby making it more difficult for unauthorized 40 including comparison processing for comparing the indepen-
third parties to enter a given air traffic control region by	 dently generated authentication codes. In one embodiment of
broadcasting false identification data for an aircraft, without	 the present invention, the authentication system includes a
adversely affecting the data throughput of the air traffic con- 	 user interface to enter a pilot's personal identification number
trol system.	 (PIN). In another embodiment, the authentication challeng-
This invention addresses these problems by employing 45 ing system and ADS-B transmitter system also include an
cryptographic techniques as part of an authentication scheme 	 encryption system to encrypt and decrypt the ADS-B broad-
to enhance the security of the ADS-B system. 	 cast positionmessage(s) (hereinafter ADS-B message).
One embodiment of the authentication apparatus and
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION	 method of the present invention employs an authentication
50 challenge-response methodology and encryption techniques
One embodiment of the secure authentication ADS-B sys- 	 to authenticate the identity of an ADS-B equipped aircraft,
tem and method of this invention requires ADS-B systems to 	 vehicle or station, as shown in FIG. 1. It should be noted that
respond to authentication challenges, verifying the identity of
	
data paths to air traffic control systems and aircraft flight
the ADS-B systems using an authentication challenge-re- 	 systems, for example, are not depicted in FIGS. 1-3. In opera-
sponse format. In this embodiment, the method for securely 55 tion, each aircraft transiting through an airspace is broadcast-
authenticating identity between an authenticator system and
	
ing its specific position data 24 and a unique ID 22, for
an ADS-B transmitter system includes the steps of: generat- 	 example, a Mode S address. The authentication challenge 12
ing a unique identifier at the authenticator system; transmit- 	 is transmitted from an ADS-B equipped aircraft, vehicle,
ting an authentication challenge containing the unique iden- 	 vessel or ground station (hereinafter Authenticator). This
tifier to the ADS-B transmitter system; generating a secure 60 invention applies an authentication scheme and optional
output by inputting the received unique identifier, the ADS-B 	 encryption to provide greater assurance that an ADS-B
transmitter system's specific data, ID and secret-key into a 	 equipped aircraft, vehicle, vessel or station (hereinafter
secure process at the ADS-B transmitter's system; generating	 ADS-B transmitter) is who it says it is. In one embodiment of
a secure code by inputting the ADS-B transmitter-generated	 the present invention, each aircraft is broadcasting its ID 22
secure output into a second secure process; transmitting the 65 and specific data 24 in an unencrypted form. In another
ADS-B transmitter-generated secure code, the ADS-B trans- 	 embodiment of the present invention, the authentication chal-
mitter's specific data and ID to the authenticator's system; 	 lenge 12 is transmitted from a ground station as part of the
US 7,730,307 B2
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uplink data. The unique identifier is a data field generated by 	 lenge 12 is broadcast in a newly-defined uplink format and the
unique identifier generator 14 that is part of the system of the 	 authentication response 18 is broadcast as part of the Mode S
Authenticator 10.	 ADS-13 message, using unused and/or reserved bits in Mode
In one embodiment of the present invention, the unique	 S ADS-13 message. In another preferred embodiment, the
identifier generator 14 comprises a random number genera- 5 authentication challenge 12 is broadcast as part of a UAT
tor. While the unique identifier can be random values, it need	 Ground Uplink and the authentication response 18 is broad-
only be unique so that an attacker cannot "learn" a valid 	 cast as part of the ADS-13 UAT broadcast position message,
response by observing the challenges 12 of the authenticator	 using unused and/or reserved bits inADS-B UAT message. In
and the corresponding responses 38. The Authenticator's sys- 	 another embodiment of the present invention, an Authentica-
tem generates a unique identifier and transmits an authenti- io for 10 issues addressed authentication challenges 12 to one or
cation challenge 12, which includes the unique identifier to	 more ADS-13 equipped platforms each broadcast cycle and
the ADS-13 transmitter 20. The ADS-13 transmitter 20 inputs	 each ADS-13 transmitter system's authentication challenge
the unique identifier, the ADS-13 transmitter's ID 22 and	 response 18 is transmitted in the corresponding transmission
specific data 24 into the authentication processing to generate	 cycle.
its authentication challenge response. The ADS-13 transmit- 15	 This secure ADS-13 technique does not depend on any one
ter's specific data 24 may include such data as position,	 specific secure hash algorithm. Some secure hash algorithms
velocity, and intent as might be provided by a flight manage- 	 have response hashes that are longer than the standard ADS-13
ment system. In one embodiment of the present invention, the 	 message size The secure hash generators, 40 and 50, contain
authentication processing of the ADS-13 transmitter system	 a secure hash algorithm, which may be implemented in hard-
comprises a secret-key 36, a secure hash generator 40 and a 20 ware or software and generate a secure hash value, 30 and 52,
Message Authentication Code (MAC) generator 35, which	 as its output. However, according to the present invention the
transform the input data into a MAC 38. The MAC 38, the	 secure hash value, 30 and 52, is input into the second secure
ADS-13 transmitter's ID 22 and theADS-B transmitter's spe- 	 process, which includes the MAC generator, 35 and 55, that
cific data 24 are then transmitted to the Authenticator 10 in an	 modifies, reduces, and/or truncates the secure hash value to
authentication response 18.	 25 generate the MAC, 38 and 58. The ADS-13 transmitter 20
In one preferred embodiment of the present invention, the 	 transmits MAC 38 to the Authenticator 10 in its authentica-
MAC 38 is transmitted as part of a 1090 MHz ADS-13 mes-	 tion response 18 to the Authenticator's authentication chal-
sage using unused and/or reserved bits in the ADS-13 1090	 lenge 12. In one embodiment of the present invention, a
MHz broadcast message format. In another preferred	 MAC, 38 and 58, for example, contains a designated 16-bit or
embodiment, the MAC 38 is transmitted in response to an 30 8-bit block from the secure hash value, 30 and 52.
authentication challenge 12 as part of the ADS-13 UAT broad- 	 Although the application of a MAC generator, 35 and 55,
cast position message, using unused and/or reserved bits in	 reduces the power of the long secure hash value, it is imprac-
theADS-B UAT message format. TheADS-B UAT broadcast 	 tical for an attacker to correctly guess the MAC and limiting
position message is broadcast approximately every second by 	 the size of the MAC 38 to a designated subset of bits alleviates
ADS-13 UAT equipped aircraft and vehicles. Authenticator 10 35 the impact of the authentication scheme of the present inven-
may receive an ADS-13 transmitter's ID 22 and specific data	 tion on the bandwidth of Mode S, UAT or VDL Mode 4, for
24 after transmitting the authentication challenge 12.	 example. As the Authenticator 10 observes the ADS-13 trans-
When the Authenticator 10 receives the ADS-13 transmit-	 mitter 20, the strength of the authentication method and con-
ter's authentication response 18, in either encrypted or unen- 	 fidence in it quickly grows. In one embodiment, the MAC 38
crypted form, the Authenticator 10 inputs the locally gener- 40 is the last 8-bits of the computed secure hash value 30.
ated unique identifier, with the received ADS-13 transmitter's 	 In another embodiment of the present invention, the
ID 32, and specific data 34 and the secret-key 36a into a	 authentication apparatus and method of the present invention
secure hash generator 50, to generate an Authenticator-gen- 	 provides identity authentication without using the authenti-
erated secure hash value 52. The secure hash value 52 is input	 cation challenge-response methodology for airspace in which
into the MAC generation processing 55 to generate an 45 lower levels of security are acceptable. As shown in FIG. 2,
Authenticator-generated MAC 58. The Authenticator's sys-	 each ADS-13 equipped aircraft inputs the ADS-13 system's
tem applies the received ADS-13 transmitter-generated MAC 	 specific data 24, ID 22 and secret code 36 into the system's
38 and the Authenticator-generated MAC 58 to comparator	 secure processing to generate a secure MAC 38 for transmis-
60 to authenticate the ADS-13 transmitter's 20 identity. If the	 sion in this method of unsolicited identity authentication. In
MAC 38 received from the ADS-13 transmitter 20 matches the 50 one embodiment the unique authentication challenge identi-
Authenticator-generated MAC 58, an authentication signal
	
fier is replaced with a default value, such as 0000, for
70 is produced indicating that the identity of the ADS-13	 example, in the secure hash algorithm. In another embodi-
transmitter is authenticated. In one embodiment of the present	 ment, a different secure hash algorithm is used that does not
invention, if an ADS-13 transmitter 20 fails two or more con- 	 have an authentication challenge input and the secure pro-
secutive authentication response comparisons, the Authenti-  55 cessing operates as described above. In a preferred embodi-
cator 10 notifies a responsible higher command authority of 	 ment, a designated ADS-13 system monitors the unsolicited
the authentication failures, so that the responsible higher 	 identity authentication contained in the ADS-13 messages.
command authority can respond appropriately. In another 	 ThemonitoringADS-B systemperforms the sameprocessing
embodiment, the Authenticator 10 issues an alert that is dis-	 steps as the ADS-13 transmitter to generate the MAC and
played to otherADS-B equipped aircraft, vehicles, vessels or 60 perform the comparison.
stations.	 In the authentication scheme of the present invention, an
In one embodiment of the present invention, an Authenti-	 ADS-13 transmitter's secret-key 36 must be available to both
cator 10 issues a broadcast authentication challenge 12 to	 the ADS-13 transmitter 20 and the Authenticator 10. In one
ADS-13 equipped platforms each broadcast cycle and the 	 embodiment of the present invention, the Authenticator 10
ADS-13 equipped platforms authentication challenge 65 will transmit broadcast authentication challenges 12 to
response 18 is transmitted in the corresponding transmission 	 ADS-13 transmitters 20 at regular intervals, requiring all
cycle. In a preferred embodiment, the authentication chal- 	 ADS-13 equipped platforms to respond. In another embodi-
US 7,730,307 B2
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ment of the present invention, the Authenticator 10 will trans-	 One requirement for accepting a hash algorithm as sound is
mit addressed authentication challenges 12 to one or more	 that there be no known method of determining the hash with-
ADS-B transmitters 20 every reporting cycle (each second for 	 out the key that is better than brute force guessing. A hash size
example). In yet another embodiment of the present inven-	 of 128 bits has 2 128 possible values and the probability of
tion, the Authenticator 10 will transmit broadcast authentica- 5 correctly guessing it is the reciprocal of that number.
tion challenges 12 and addressed authentication challenges	 Although this is a very small probability, in the general field
12 to one or more ADS-B transmitters 20 at regular intervals.	 of cryptographic authentication, this is minimally acceptable.
Since there will be multiple ADS-B transmitters 20 being	 In the ADS-B aviation application, broadcasting a 128-bit or
authenticated during any reporting cycle, it is preferable that 	 larger hash value is impractical due to the small message
each ADS-B transmitter 20 has its own secret-key 36. Each io sizes, but fortunately the probability of guessing the hash
ADS-B transmitter 20 having its own secret-key 36 also helps	 value does not have to be extremely low. The reason for this is
protect the ADS-B system from a system wide attack. The	 as follows. In a typical authentication application, an attacker
secret-key 36 can be of any agreed-upon length, and the 	 experiences no penalty or risk in making a wrong guess. In
length maybe varied for military or other unique applications. 	 addition, one successful guess represents a successful attack
The secret key can be composed of a predefined combina- 15 (for example, gaining login access to a computer). In our
tion of any number of separate key values and thus provide an 	 aviation application, the messages with authentication hashes
authentication of any number of individual entities. For 	 occur one or more times per second as an aircraft flies through
example, in one embodiment, a secret key can be composed 	 a region. An attacker gains little by correctly guessing one of
of the combination of a secret binary number stored in the 	 the hashes. All of the hashes must be correct to be authenti-
ADS-B transceiver of an aircraft and a Personal Identification 20 cated. Additionally, an incorrect hash is immediately obvious
Number (PIN) assigned to the pilot. In this embodiment, the	 and makes the target suspect. For this reason, a much smaller
successful authentication check by the authenticator gives an 	 hash, say 8 bits or fewer, is quite acceptable for ADS-B. With
assurance that theADS-B message came from the aircraft that 	 each transmitted ADS-B message, the probability of guessing
the message claims it to be from, and that the pilot is the 	 the correct hash for that message and all of the previous ones
authorized pilot for that flight. In another embodiment, the 25 grows smaller and the strength of the authentication
key can be the combination of the ADS-B transceiver secret	 increases.
binary number and the pilot PIN as in the last embodiment	 In one embodiment, the ADS-B transmitter's secure hash
plus an additional PIN entered by a cargo dispatcher certify- 	 value 30 is input into a message authentication code (MAC)
ing that the cargo has had the required screening. Additional 	 generator 35, which generates a message authentication code
PINS can be supplied by other authorized people monitoring 30 (MAC) 38 for the ADS-B transmitter 20. The Authenticator
other phases of the flight on the ground or in the air. Addi- 	 10 inputs its secure hash value 52 into MAC generator 55 to
tional binary values obtained from other systems on board the 	 generate its MAC 58. By design, the transmitted MAC 38
aircraft or station transmitting the ADS-B message. 	 contains fewer bits than the associated secure hash value 30.
The secret key used by the ADS-B transmitter 20 must be	 In one embodiment of the present invention, the MAC, 38 and
discoverable by the Authenticator 10. In one embodiment, the 35 58 contains a truncated subset of the secure hash value, 30. In
Authenticator 10 has access to a database of flight plan data, 	 another embodiment of the present invention, the MAC, 38
associating a flight withthe pilots, aircraft, cargo or passenger 	 and 58, is generated by using a moving bit pattern of a pre-
dispatcher, or any other authorized people monitoring other 	 determined length, for example, 8-bits, with the bits selection
phases of the flight on the ground or in the air. The Authen- 	 based on a predetermined sequence, to truncate the MAC
ticator 10 can then use this flight plan database along with 40 generator output. In yet another embodiment, the predeter-
identifying content of the ADS-B message to determine the 	 mined bit selection sequence changes at predetermined inter-
pilots, aircraft, cargo or passenger dispatcher, or any other 	 vals. In still another embodiment, the MAC, 38 and 58, com-
authorized people monitoring other phases of the flight, and 	 prises a predetermined subset of bits that are non-contiguous.
to lookup in a secure database the corresponding PINS and/or 	 In yet an additional embodiment, the number of bits in the
secret binary numbers comprising the secret key. In one spe-  45 predetermined pattern is 8-bits or less.
cific embodiment for air traffic control, the identifying con- 	 In one embodiment of the present invention, the authenti-
tent of the ADS-B message is the aircraft Mode-S address. In	 cation challenge 12 unique identifier is 16-bits in length. The
another specific embodiment the identifying content is the	 ADS-B transmitter specific data 34 may be transmitted as
Mode 3/A code.	 encrypted data or unencrypted data (i.e., sent in-the-clear).
In one embodiment, the secure hash algorithm, 40 and 50, 5o TheADS-B transmitter's ID, 22 and 32, is a constant value of
can operate on the ADS-B transmitter ID, 22 and 32, and	 constant length. TheADS-B transmitter's specific data 24 and
specific data, 24 and 34, in an unencrypted form, as shown on 	 34 will comprise a segment of allocated bits in a standard
FIG. 1. In another embodiment, the secure hash algorithm, 40	 ADS-B message. The number of bits comprising the ADS-B
and 50, can operate on the ADS-B transmitter ID 32 and	 transmitter's specific data 24 and 34 is typically defined by
specific data 34 in an encrypted form, as shown on FIG. 3. In 55 international standard. Currently, for example, a Mode-S
this case, the Authenticator 10 must use the ADS-B transmit-	 message contains 112-bits of data and a Universal Access
ter's ID 32 and specific data 34 in the secure hash algorithm	 Transceiver (UAT) message contains either 240-bits or 384-
50, prior to decryption. Note that the determination by the 	 bits of data.
authenticator of the secret key to use, discussed in paragraphs	 While the specification describes the authentication of an
[0021] and [0022], must come from knowledge of the identity 6o aircraft by an authenticator, typically but not necessarily a
of the ADS-B transmitter. If the encryption scheme encrypts	 ground station/authority, the method is equally applicable to
this information, it must be decrypted before determining the 	 authentication of the ground station by an aircraft or other
identity. This process is not elaborated in FIG. 3. In yet	 user of information sent from the ground. In one embodiment
another embodiment of the present invention, some aircraft 	 of the present invention, a ground station transmits a MAC in
are broadcasting their ID 32 and specific data 34 in an 65 the uplink message so that transiting aircraft can authenticate
encrypted form and other aircraft are broadcasting their ID 32	 the transmitting ground station's identity. In another embodi-
and specific data 34 in an unencrypted form.	 ment of the present invention, transiting aircraft can request
US 7,730,307 B2
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authentication of ground stations or vehicles. In this embodi-
ment, the identification, 22 and 32, and specific data, 24 and
34, used in the secure hash algorithm is the ground station ID
and designated up-link data, such as weather data, in place of
Mode S ID, position, and velocity. The method described
herein is valid and useful as long as the data used to authen-
ticate the ground station is predetermined and agreed in
advance, and the same data used to generate the MAC, 38 and
58, for comparison 60.
Where an ADS-13 transmitter system has not received an
authentication challenge, the ADS-13 transmitter system gen-
erates a MAC using the challenge unique identifier from the
most recent received authentication challenge, in one specific
embodiment of the present invention. Here, if the ADS-13
transmitter's message fails the MAC comparison, the authen-
ticator recomputes the MAC using the last challenge unique
identifier for the ADS-13 transmitter, thereby reducing false
identity authentication comparisons. In another embodiment,
the ADS-13 transmitter system generates a MAC using a pre-
determined default value for the challenge unique identifier
where the ADS-13 transmitter system has not received an
authentication challenge. In this case, if the ADS-13 transmit-
ter's message fails the MAC comparison, the authenticator
recomputes the MAC using the predetermined default value.
In yet another embodiment of the present invention, the pilot
or operator of the ADS-13 transmitter system can turn the
authentication system of the present invention ON/OFF.
While the invention has been described in connection with
a presently preferred embodiment thereof, those skilled in the
art will appreciate that various modifications and changes
may be made therein without departing from the true spirit
and scope of the invention which is accordingly intended to be
limited solely by the appended claims.
We claim:
1. A method for unsolicited identity authentication of an
ADS-13 system comprising the steps of:
(a) generating an authentication secure code by inputting
said ADS-13 transmitter system's specific data, ID and
secret-key in secure processing in said ADS-13 transmit-
ter system;
(b) transmitting an ADS-13 message comprising said
ADS-13 transmitter system's specific data, ID and secure
code from said ADS-13 transmitter system;
(c) receiving at least one of said ADS-13 messages trans-
mitted from said at least one ADS-13 transmitter system
at an authentication monitoring system;
(d) determining said at least one ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's secret-key independently at said authentication
monitoring system;
(e) generating an authentication secure code by inputting
said ADS-13 transmitter system's specific data, ID and
said ADS-13 transmitter system's secret-key in secure
processing in said authentication monitoring system;
(f) comparing said authentication monitoring system-gen-
erated secure code and said ADS-13 transmitter-gener-
ated secure code using comparison processing for each
of said at least one ADS-13 transmitter system at said
authentication monitoring system; and
(g) authenticating said ADS-13 transmitter system's iden-
tity where the output of said comparison processing is
said authentication monitoring system-generated secure
code and saidADS-B transmitter-generated secure code
are the same,
wherein said secure processing at saidADS-B transmit-
ter and said authentication monitoring system further
comprises the steps of:
8
generating a secure data string of given length from a
first secure data process wherein said first secure
data process is a secure hash algorithm and said
output of said first secure data process is a hash
5	 value;
inputting said secure data string of given length into a
second secure data process wherein said second
secure data process is a message authentication
code (MAC) generator and said output of said sec-
10	 and secure data process is a MAC; and
receiving a secure code generated by said second
secure data process, wherein said secure code con-
tains fewer bits than said secure data string of given
length from said first secure data process and said
15	 secure code is 16 bits or less in length.
2. The method of claim 1 further comprising encrypting
saidADS-B system specific data and ID prior to transmission.
3. The method of claim 1 wherein said authentication
monitoring system is a ground station.
20 4. The method of claim 1 wherein said authentication
monitoring system is an ADS-13 equipped aircraft or an
ADS-13 equipped vessel.
5. A method for securely authenticating identity between
an authenticator's system and at least one ADS-13 transmit-
25 ter's system comprising the steps of:
(a) generating a unique identifier at said authenticator's
system;
(b) transmitting an authentication challenge containing
said unique identifier to said at least one ADS-13 trans-
30	 mitter's system;
(c) generating an authentication secure code by inputting
said received unique identifier, ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's specific data, ID and secret-key in secure process-
ing in said at least one ADS-13 transmitter's system;
35 (d) transmitting an authentication challenge response com-
prising said ADS-13 transmitter-generated secure code,
said ADS-13 transmitter specific data and ID from said at
least one ADS-13 transmitter's system to said authenti-
cator's system;
40 (e) receiving said authentication challenge response trans-
mitted from said at least one ADS-13 transmitter's sys-
tem at said authenticator's system;
(f) determining said at least one ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's secret-key independently;
45 (g) generating an authentication secure code by inputting
said unique identifier, said ADS-13 transmitter system's
specific data, ID and said ADS-13 transmitter system's
secret-key in secure processing in said authenticator's
system;
50 (h) comparing said authenticator-generated secure code
and said ADS-13 transmitter-generated secure code
using comparison processing for each of said at least one
ADS-13 transmitter system; and
(i) authenticating saidADS-B transmitter system's identity
55	 where the output of said comparison processing is said
authenticator-generated secure code and said ADS-13
transmitter-generated secure code are the same,
wherein said secure processing at said ADS-13 transmit-
ter system and said authenticator system further com-
bo	 prises the steps of:
generating a secure data string of given length from a
first secure data process wherein said first secure
data process is a secure hash algorithm and said
output of said first secure data process is a hash
65	 value,
inputting said secure data string of given length from
said first secure data process into a second secure
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data process wherein said second secure data pro-
cess is a message authentication code (MAC) gen-
erator and said output of said second secure data
process is a MAC; and
receiving a secure code generated by said second
secure data process, wherein said secure code con-
tains fewer bits than said secure data string of given
length from said first secure data process and said
secure code is 16 bits or less in length.
6. The method of claim 5 further comprising encrypting
saidADS-B transmitter's system datapriorto transmissionto
said authenticator system.
7. The method of claim 6 further comprising inputting said
ADS-13 transmitter's system data to said secure data process
prior to decryption by said authenticator system, wherein said
ADS-13 transmitter's system data is encrypted prior to being
input into said secure process at said ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem.
8. The method of claim 6 further comprising inputting said
ADS-13 transmitting system data to said secure data process
after decryption at said authenticator system, wherein said
ADS-13 transmitter's system data is input into said secure
process at said ADS-13 transmitter system prior to being
encrypted.
9. The method of claim 5 wherein determining said at least
one ADS-13 transmitter system's secret-key comprises gen-
erating said secret-key by inputting at least one of flight ID,
personal identification number (PIN) of assigned pilot or
other authorized personnel and said ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's mode S address into a key generation algorithm.
10. The method of claim 5 wherein determining said at
least oneADS-B transmitter system's secret-key comprises a
database look-up of said secret key.
11. The method of claim 5 wherein said second secure
process further comprises the steps of: selecting a subset of
bits from said secure data string of given length output by said
first secure process using a selection of bits that changes for
each message according to a predetermined pattern of bit
selection.
12. The method of claim 11 further comprising: changing
said predetermined pattern of bit selection automatically at
predetermined intervals.
13. The method of claim 5 wherein said second secure
process further comprises the steps of: selecting a predeter-
mined subset of contiguous or non-contiguous bits from said
secure data string of given length output from said first secure
process.
14. The method of claim 5 further comprising outputting
said secure code of any length equal to or less than the secure
hash algorithm output.
15. A method for secure authentication between two or
more ADS-13 equipped systems comprising:
(a) generating a unique identifier in a unique identifier
generator in an authenticator system;
(b) communicating said unique identifier in an authentica-
tion challenge from said authenticator system to one or
more ADS-13 transmitter systems;
(c)receiving said authentication challenge containing said
unique identifier communicated by said authenticator
system at said one or more ADS-13 transmitter systems;
(d) inputting data comprising said unique identifier,
ADS-13 transmitter system specific data, ID and secret
data into secure data processing;
(e)receiving a secure representation of said input data from
said secure data processing at said ADS-13 transmitter
system;
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(f) communicating said secure representation of said input
data and said ADS-13 transmitter system's specific data
and ID from said one or more ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tems to said authenticator system;
5 (g) receiving said secure representation of said input data
and said ADS-13 transmitter system's specific data and
ID communicated by said one ormoreADS-B transmit-
ter systems at said authenticator system;
10	 (h) determining said one or more ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's secret data independently;
(i) inputting said unique identifier, said ADS-B transmitter
system's specific data, ID and secret data for each of said
one or more ADS-13 transmitter systems into secure data
15	 processing of said authenticator system;
0) receiving a secure representation of said input data from
said secure data processing of said authenticator system
data for each of said one or more ADS-13 transmitter
20	 systems;
(k) inputting said authenticator system-generated secure
representation of said input data and said ADS-13 trans-
mitter system-generated secure representation of said
input data for each of said one or more ADS-13 transmit-
25	 ter systems into comparison processing at said authen-
ticator system; and
(1) authenticating said one or more ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's identity where said authenticator system-gener-
30 ated secure representation of said input data and saidADS-13 transmitter system-generated secure representa-
tion of said input data are the same,
wherein said secure data processing at each of said two
or more ADS-13 equipped systems further comprises
35	 the steps of:
generating a secure data string of given length in a first
secure data process wherein said first secure data
process is a secure hash algorithm and said output
of said first secure data process is a hash value;
40 inputting said secure data string generated by said first
secure data process into a second secure data pro-
cess wherein said second secure data process is a
message authentication code (MAC) generator and
45	 said output of said second secure data process is a
MAC; and
generating said secure representation of said input
data in said second secure data process from said
secure data string of given length, wherein said
50 secure representation of said input data contains
fewer bits than said secure data string from said first
secure data process and said secure representation
of said input data is 16 bits or less in length.
16. The method of claim 15 wherein said ADS-13 transmit-
55 ter system's specific data comprises at least a predetermined
subset of the content of an ADS-13 message.
17. The method of claim 15 wherein said ADS-13 transmit-
ter system's secret data comprises a secret-key.
60 18. The method of claim 17 further comprising generating
said secret-key by inputting at least one of flight ID, personal
identification number (PIN) of assigned pilot or other autho-
rized personnel and saidADS-B transmitter system's mode S
address into a key generation algorithm.
65 19. The method of claim 17 wherein determining said at
least one ADS-13 transmitter system's secret-key comprises a
database look-up of said secret key.
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20. An ADS-13 secure authentication system comprising:
an authenticator system comprising:
a. means for generating and storing a unique identifier;
b. means for communicating said unique identifier to
one or more ADS-13 transmitter systems in an authen-
tication challenge;
c. means for receiving said one or more ADS-13 trans-
mitter systems communication in response to said
authentication challenge;
d. means for determining said one or moreADS-B trans-
mitter system's secret-key;
e. means for securely processing input data comprising
said unique identifier, said ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem's secret-key, identification (ID) and specific data
to generate a secure code for each of said one or more
ADS-13 transmitter systems;
f. means for comparing said authenticator system-gen-
erated secure code and said ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem-generated secure code for each of said one or
more ADS-13 transmitter systems; and
g. means for authenticating saidADS-B transmitter sys-
tem's identity where said authenticator system-gen-
erated secure code and said ADS-13 transmitter sys-
tem-generated secure code are the same; and
h. means for communicating a failed authentication
comparison;
said one or more ADS-13 transmitter systems comprising:
a. means for receiving said authentication challenge
transmitted by said authenticator system;
b. means for securely processing said received unique
identifier, said ADS-13 transmitter system's secret-
key, identification (ID) and specific data to generate a
secure code; and
c. means for communicating said secure code and said
ADS-13 transmitter system's identification (ID) and
specific data to said authenticator system in response
to said authentication challenge,
wherein said means for securely processing at said authen-
ticator system and said one or more ADS-13 transmitter
systems further comprises:
• first means for securely processing and generating a
secure data string of given length from said input data
wherein said first means for securely processing is a
secure hash generator further comprising a secure
hash algorithm and said output of said first means for
securely processing is a hash value;
• second means for securely processing said secure data
string of given length output from said first means for
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securely processing and generating said secure code
wherein said second means for securely processing is
a message authentication code (MAC) generator and
said output of said secondmeans for securely process-
5 ing is a MAC, and, wherein said secure code contains
fewer bits than said secure data string of given length
from said first means for securely processing and said
secure code is 16 bits or less in length.
21. The system of claim 20 further comprising a means for
10 encrypting saidADS-B transmitter system identification (ID)
and specific data prior to transmission to said authenticator
system.
22. The system of claim 20 wherein said means for gener-
ating said secret-key comprises inputting at least one of flight
15 ID, personal identification number (PIN) of assigned pilot or
other authorized personnel and said ADS-13 transmitter's
mode S address into a key generation algorithm.
23. The method of claim 20 wherein determining said at
least one ADS-13 transmitter system's secret-key comprises a
20 database look-up of said secret key.
24. The system of claim 20 wherein said second means for
securely processing comprises truncating said secure data
string of given length output from said first means for
securely processing using a selection of bits that changes for
25 each message according to a predetermined pattern of bit
selection.
25. The system of claim 24 wherein said second means for
securely processing further comprises changing said prede-
3o termined pattern of bit selection automatically at predeter-
mined intervals.
26. The system of claim 20 wherein said second means for
securely processing comprises selecting a predetermined
subset of contiguous or non-contiguous bits from said secure
35 data string of given length output from said first means for
securely processing.
27. The system of claim 20 wherein said second means for
securely processing comprises generating said secure code by
truncating said secure data string of given length output from
40 said first means for securely processing to a different and
smaller number of bits.
28. The system of claim 20 wherein said means for com-
municating said unique identifier to said one or more ADS-13
transmitter systems comprises transferring or sending said
45 unique identifier using RF, light, sound, or other medium to
send, receive or transfer said data.
